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MEASURE PHRASES AS MODIFIERS OFADJECTIVES 1
ABSTRACT
In some languages, measure phrases can appear with non-compared
adjectives : 5 feet tall. I address three questions about this construction : (a) Is
the measure phrase an argument of the adjective or an adjunct ? (b) What are
we to make of the markedness of this construction *142lbs heavy? (c) Why is
it that the markedness disappears once the adjective is put in the comparative
(2 inches taller alongside 2lbs heavier) ?
I claim that because degree arguments are ‘functional’, the measure phrase has
to be an adjunct and not a syntactic argument of the adjective. Like event
modifiers in extended NPs and in VPs, the measure phrase predicates of a
degree argument of the adjective. But given the kind of meaning a measure
phrase must have to do its job in comparatives and elsewhere, it is not of the
right type to directly predicate of a degree argument. I propose a lexically
governed type-shift which applies to some adjectives allowing them to
combine with a measure phrase.
KEYWORDS
Adjective, measure phrase, degree, functional category, lexical, adjunct,
argument, antonymy.
1. Introduction
There is a widely accepted account of expressions like five feet tall
according to which the adjective tall denotes a relation between individuals
and degrees of height and the measure phrase, five feet, serves as an argument
of the adjective, saturating the degree-place in the relation 2. This account has
much to recommend it. Ameasure phrase is just a special kind of noun phrase
and noun phrases are the canonical category for arguments of predicates. The
combination is interpreted via function-application, a simple and familiar
operation. And the degree argument for the adjective is independently
justified by the role it plays in the analysis of the superlative, the comparative,
too and enough.
Having said what I think is right about the argument account of pre-
adjectival measure phrases 3, let me say what’s wrong with it. The area to the
left of the adjective is normally associated with modifiers of the adjective (e.g.
extremely tall) whereas internal arguments of adjectives usually appear to the
right (sick of working). Nouns and verbs tend to follow the same pattern, at
least with respect to arguments. If the measure phrase is indeed an argument
of the adjective, we need an explanation for why we have five feet tall and not
*tall (of) five feet. We also need an explanation for why the main stress is on
tall in five feet táll, when the general rule in English is that in neutral contexts
a predicate is less stressed than its argument 4.
On the view in question, if John is five feet tall, then five feet names
John’s height. That seems to imply that John’s height itself refers to a (degree
of) height. But then why is it impossible to say *John’s height tall? Likewise,
why can we say John is 10 years old, but not *Mary is John’s age old?
I’d like to suggest an answer to this last question, one that will lead to
a deeper problem with the argument account of five feet tall. In many respects
the degree-argument position of a gradable adjective behaves like non-
thematic arguments such as event-arguments and temporal and modal
arguments. The degree argument can be bound by function words such as too
in too tall or the comparative morpheme er in taller. This type of binding is
consistent across all gradable adjectives. Unlike with thematic arguments, it
is not subject to the vicissitudes of subcategorization. The tenses similarly are
expressed by functional morphemes and bound by when and no verb’s
temporal argument can resist their binding. Modals are likewise functional
expressions that are often taken to freely bind world variables. Adjuncts such
as surprisingly, extremely and perhaps very can be used to predicate of the
degree argument (Klein, 1998), just as adjuncts predicate of event arguments
and temporal arguments. Non-thematic arguments are so-called because they
cannot be saturated with noun phrases. The impossibility of *10 :00 kill my
dog is not to be held against the view that kill has a temporal argument, nor
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should *Jack killed a dog Fido’s murder be held against those who claim that
the verb kill has an event place. 10 :00 and Fido’s murder are the wrong kinds
of expressions to fill a temporal or an event argument slot. And similarly, the
ungrammaticality of *my father’s height tall is expected because although tall
has a degree argument, that argument is non-thematic. The noun phrase my
father’s height is the wrong kind of thing to occupy the degree-argument slot.
In the taxonomy of Higginbotham (1985), degree arguments, like event-
arguments are q-identified or q-bound, but are not discharged by q-marking.
This means that since measure phrases are just a special kind of noun phrase,
the idea that they can occupy the degree argument slot of a gradable adjective
in fact runs counter to what one would expect.
There is another consideration that is independent of the previous ones
and which presents a problem for all existing accounts of measure phrases in
adjective phrases, not just the measure-phrase-as-argument account. The
ability of an adjective to combine directly with a measure phrase turns out to
be somewhat of a lexical idiosyncrasy. Unlike tall, there are many adjectives
that have ‘syntactically visible’ degree arguments but that do not combine
with appropriate measure phrases. The example in (1) shows a comparative
binding the degree argument of expensive in conjunction with an appropriate
measure phrase, five dollars. Example (2)shows that the measure phrase
cannot directly combine with the adjective.
(1) five dollars more expensive
(2) *five dollars expensive
There are languages in which all adjectives are like expensive in resisting
direct combination with appropriate measure phrases. The virtue of the
function-argument analysis is its simplicity. Since this type of operation
occurs elsewhere in the grammar, nothing special needs to be said beyond the
interpretation of the adjective as a function and the measure phrase as an
argument. But if nothing special is said about five feet tall then nothing can be
unsaid about *five dollars expensive.
In the following pages, I plan to give an account in which pre-
adjectival measure phrases are modifiers. They do their work as predicates of
non-thematic degree arguments just as Davidsonian adverbs and some
prenominal adjectives do their work as event-predicates (Larson, 1998). As
we will discover, the semantics of the measure phrase is such as to require an
adjustment in the meaning of the adjective in order to allow this type of
modification to go through. This adjustment will be stated as a lexical rule
that applies to tall but not to expensive.
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2. The distribution of measure phrases in adjectival phrases
As just noted, it is quite often the case that a measure phrase cannot be
directly combined with an appropriate adjective (*five dollars expensive),
even though it can be used in a comparative (five dollars more expensive). All
of the examples in (3)-(5) are ungrammatical, and in every case they would
be made grammatical if the adjective were put in the comparative :
(3) a. *6 lbs heavy/light j. *2 percentage points likely
b. *30° hot/cold/warm k. *2 degrees acute
c. *80 mph fast/slow l. *it takes 2 days long
d. *$5 cheap/expensive m.*200 pounds fat/thin
e. *2 inches big/small n. *The winds are 25 mph strong.
f. *3 shades dark/light o. *30 miles close/far/near
g. *50 decibels loud/soft p. *600 watts powerful 5
h. *$10 6 rich/poor q. *20 points popular
i. *20 IQ points intelligent/stupid r. *20pts well/bad on the exam
(4) Examples from Murphy (1997)
a. *40 square meters large
b. *8 scovils hot (measurement of chili-hotness)
c. *3 chroma saturated (measurement of gray tone in a color)
(5) a. *2 inches narrow/short/shallow/low/thin
b. *2 years young/short/new
The adjectives in(5) represent a special case because they all have antonyms
that do combine directly with measure phrases. A lot has been said concerning
this asymmetry and we will draw on those insights in our discussion below.
The data in(3)-(5) shows that direct combination with a measure
phrase is lexically conditioned. Further evidence for this conclusion comes
from a comparison between languages, where we find differences in the set of
adjectives that support this construction. In (6)-(9), I’ve listed grammatical
examples whose English counterparts are ungrammatical 6 :
(6) pesante [quasi due tonnellate]
heavy almost 2 tons
‘weighs almost two tons’ (Italian. Zamparelli, 2000 : 284)
(7) is 2 boeken rijk
is books rich
‘owns two books’ (Dutch. Corver, 1990 : 224)
(8) Het dorp is twee kilometer ver
the village is 2 km far
‘the village is two kilometers away’ (Dutch. Seuren, 1978)
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(9) a. 35° heiss, ‘35° hot’ (German)
b. -10° kalt ‘-10° cold’
c. 100 Tonnen schwer ‘100 tons heavy’
d. 130 Meter gross ‘130 meters big’7
e. 60 Stundenkilometer schnell ‘60 kilometers-per-hour fast’
I have found that generally, if an adjective in English directly
combines with a measure phrase, its German translation does too but not vice-
versa. Two exceptions to this rule are late and early. *zwei Minuten spät ‘two
minutes late’ and *zwei Minuten früh ‘two minutes early’ are both
ungrammatical.
French adjectives, when they do combine with a measure phrase,
prefer it on the right :
(10) haut de 1,27m ‘1.27m high’ (French)
(11) épais de 20 cm ‘20 cm thick’
While tall is the stock example of an adjective that combines directly with a
measure phrase, its closest counterpart in French does not combine with a
measure phrase :
(12) *grand de 1,27m ‘1.27m tall’
Of course, when grand ‘tall’ is used in the comparative or in a deadjectival
verb, the measure phrase is fine :
(13) est plus grand que Marie de 2 centimètres (French)
is more tall than Marie by 2 centimeters
‘is 2 cm taller than Marie’
(14) a grandi de 2cm ‘grew 2cm’ (French)
The adjective profond ‘deep’ differs in the same way from its English
counterpart, while the adjective riche goes the other way. It does combine
with a measure phrase while its English counterpart does not :
(15) riche de deux millions (French)
‘rich to $2 million’ (‘is worth $2million’)
Some languages never allow for measure phrases directly combining
with an adjective, even though they do allow measure phrases in
comparatives. These languages include Japanese (Snyder et al., 1995),
Russian (Matushansky, 2002) and Spanish (Bosque, 1999). I suspect that this
is the norm rather than the exception. I would also guess that one doesn’t find
the reverse situation. Let us call a measure phrase when it combines with a
plain adjective a ‘direct measure phrase’ (two feet tall) and we’ll call a
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measure phrase when it combines with a comparative or too phrase an
‘indirect measure phrase’ (two feet taller). I hypothesize that :
(16) If a language has direct measure phrases, it will have indirect measure phrases,
but not vice versa.
The universal in (16) says that direct measure phrases are marked. This
markedness appears to influence acquisition (Snyder et. al., 1995). Our goal
now is to say what the source of the markedness is.
3. The Comparative : Measure phrases are predicates of gaps.
If John is taller than Mary, then John’s height exceeds Mary’s. Taking
tall to be a relation between individuals and their heights, we can express this
fact with the formula in (17).
(17) a. John is taller than Mary.
b. ∃hj ∃hm tall'(j, hj) & tall'(m, hm) & (hj hm)
I am not spelling out the meanings for all the parts of the comparative
construction. That would take us more deeply into the syntax of comparatives
than we need to go. The formula in (17). is meant to show what the analysis
should do. It crucially presupposes an ordering of points, in the case of tall we
call them ‘heights’, and it presupposes that a gradable adjective denotes a
relation between individuals and these ordered points (for further details see
Cresswell, 1976).
If John’s height indeed exceeds Mary’s then there is a gap that spans
from Mary’s height up to John’s. Ameasure phrase can be used to tell us what
the size of that gap is. If John is 2 inches taller than Mary, then it’s a two-inch
gap. I express this fact with the formula in (18) :
(18) a. John is [2 inches] taller than Mary.
b. ∃hj ∃hm tall'(j, hj) & tall'(m, hm) & 2-inches([hm→hj])
[h
m
→hj] denotes the gap that spans from Mary’s height, hm, up to John’s
height, hj, and the measure phrase is treated as a predicate giving the size of
that gap.
When we work with a ruler, we use the expression two inches in two
different ways. On one use, two inches names the point labeled as such or the
part of the ruler that extends from the left up to that point. On the other use,
two inches is a predicate applying to any part of the ruler that is two inches
long. It is this second predicative use that comes into play in the comparative.
In the temporal domain these two uses are verbally distinguished. 5 o’clock
on July 18, 1981 names a point on the time line and July 18, 1981 names a
particular day-long interval. five hours, on the other hand, is a predicate, true
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of any interval of a certain size on the time line. Taking later than to express
a relation between points on the time line, we use five hours to describe the
gap introduced by the comparative (five hours later) and not 5 o’clock (*5
o’clock later). This is the guiding intuition in formulating (18)..
If the purpose of a measure phrase is to describe a gap, and
comparatives necessarily entail the presence of a gap, it is no surprise that
they fit together so snugly. The same can be said for too. To say that John is
too old to work is to say that there is a non-empty gap between John’s age and
the cutoff for working. And if the size of that gap is 20 years, then he is 20
years too old to work. Degree achievement verbs such as grandir ‘grow’ in
(14). entail a gap between values taken at two different times, and the measure
phrase indicates the size of the gap (Hay, Kennedy & Levin, 1999). So-called
degree heads do not always entail the presence of a gap. I may be as old as
you, with no gap between our ages. And Frank may be old enough to work,
with no gap between his age and the cutoff for working. Degree phrases
headed by as or enough never have measure phrase specifiers 8.
The idea that measure phrases are gap-predicates is not a new one.
McConnell-Ginet (1973 :135) introduces it in her account of comparatives.
For some reason, the gap-predicate idea is absent from nearly every account
of comparatives based on the premise that degrees are arguments of the
compared predicate 9. But as (18) shows, the gap-predicate idea is not
incompatible with degrees as arguments and indeed I argue that it is the
correct way of viewing measure phrases in these contexts.
Viewing measure phrases as gap-predicates allows us to understand
how their internal semantics works. As noted above in connection with the
comparative in (17), we assume a set of ordered points associated with a
gradable predicate, in the case of tall we call these points heights. This set is
presumably dense : for any two points, there is a third point that lies between
them in the ordering. A predicate like foot is true of certain sets of these
points. Which sets it is true of and which not is determined by a measure on
the sets, the details of which it is the business of a theory of measurement to
explicate. feet, the plural of the measure word foot, is true of any set of points
S that can be partitioned into two or more subsets each of which is in the
extension of foot. The quantifier that precedes the measure term tells us how
many of these subsets are in the partition, in roughly the same way that it does
in an ordinary plural such as 4 boys 10. This analysis has an advantage over
other accounts when one looks at a phrase like several feet tall. several feet is
true of an interval of points if it can be partitioned into several subintervals
each of which is a foot. Notice that there is no point on the scale
corresponding to several feet, as would be required on the view that measure
phrases denote points on the scale. And accounts that take measure nouns to
denote two place relations between objects and numbers (Quine, 1960 : 244-
MEASURE PHRASES AS MODIFIERS OF ADJECTIVES 213
245 ; Krifka, 1989 ; Higginbotham, 1994 ; Chierchia, 1998 :74) would be
forced to analyze several as a number of sorts and would be hard pressed to
explain the number marking on feet.
4. The Positive
We’re taking gradable predicates to have degree arguments. This is
reflected in our decision to present the analysis of the comparative in (17) in
terms of a two place predicate tall' relating individuals to degrees. There are
at least two ways to understand tall'(x,d) corresponding to the two glosses in
(19), the latter following a suggestion in Kamp (1975) :
(19) a. tall'(x,d) “x’s height is exactly d”
b. tall'(x,d) “x’s height exceeds d”
Up to now I’ve been assuming the exactly-reading in (19a) , however,
the exceeds-reading is preferable if one wants to capture positive uses of tall,
as in (20a) and (21a) below.
(20) a. Jacob is tall and Kim is tall.
b. tall'(j,d) and tall'(k,d)
(21) a. Jacob is tall but Esau is not tall.
b. tall'(j,d) and ¬ (tall'(e,d)).
Assuming the exceeds-reading, we can capture the context dependence
of the positive very simply by taking the context to supply a value for the free
degree-argument (compare contextually supplied values for temporal, world
or event arguments). When the context supplies a value for the degree
argument, (20a) is true so long as both Jacob’s and Kim’s heights exceed this
value. As Gawron (1995) points out, the exactly-reading would incorrectly
predict (20a) to automatically be false if Jacob and Kim were not the same
height.
Suppose now that Jacob and Kim were of different heights, but that the
twins Jacob and Esau were equally tall. Whether or not (20) is true will
depend on what value the context supplies and how precisely it supplies it. In
some contexts, (20) will even be without a truth-value. But as Kamp (1975)
and Kamp & Partee (1995) discuss, (21) does not suffer the same fate. It will
always be judged false because its truth does not vary with the particular
choice of value for the degree argument. This difference between (20) and
(21) is also captured on the exceeds-reading but not on the exactly-reading,
along with a theory about how a parameter like the free degree variable in tall
gets it value.
For these reasons we want to adopt the exceeds reading of tall' and this
necessitates a modification in our analysis of the comparative, repeated
below:
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(22) a. John is taller than Mary.
b. ∃hj ∃hm tall'(j, hj) & tall'(m, hm) & (hj hm)
Given the exceeds reading recently adopted, for any x, tall'(x,d) is satisfied by
many degrees : all those that lie below x’s height. It is the upper limit for this
set that is relevant to the comparative. So we need a formula as in (23).
(23) ∃hj ∃hm (hj = UpLim({d : tall'(j,d)}) hm = UpLim({d: tall'(m,d)}) (hj hm))
The upper-limit also has a role to play in the semantics of de-adjectival
nominalization. On the recently adopted view, tall is a predicate that relates x
to any degree d relative to which x counts as tall. That leads to the following
equation :
(24) height'(x) = UpLim({d : tall'(x,d)})
Putting together (18), (23) and (24) we get :
(25) a. John is [2 inches] taller than Mary.
b. 2-inches'([height'(m), height'(j)]).
c. the size of the interval from Mary’s height to John’s height is 2-inches.
5. Adjectives modified by measure phrases are ambiguous
In the introduction, I considered the illformedness of *John’s height
tall or *John’s age old. I claimed that since degree arguments are ‘functional’
they cannot be saturated by a noun phrase, but can only be bound by
functional heads such as the comparative. Another alternative is that the noun
phrase could be an adjunct which functions semantically as a predicate of the
degree argument. The formulas in (26)-(28b) illustrate this idea and how it
parallels event-modifying adjuncts :
(26) a. Mary is [John’s height] tall.
b. ∃d [tall'(m,d)  John’s.height'(d)]
(27) a. John quickly left.
b. ∃e [leaving'(e)  Agent(e,j)  quick'(e)]
(28) a. Olga is a beautiful dancer. (following Larson 1998 11)
b. [Gen e][dancing'(e, olga)] [beautiful'(e)]
While (26) conforms to the syntax-semantics constraints discussed
in the introduction, it does not work semantically. John’s height is a degree-
name, not a degree-predicate, as compared with quickly and beautiful both of
which are event-predicates as required. What then happens when John’s
height is replaced with a measure phrase :
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(29) a. Mary is [5 feet] tall.
b. ∃d [tall'(m,d)  5feet'(d)]
(30) a. *Mary is [50 pounds] heavy.
b. ∃d [heavy'(m,d)  50-pounds'(d)]
Given what we said above, switching to a measure phrase should not
improve matters. A measure phrase is a predicate of a set of degrees, in the
case of the comparative this set is just the gap between the two degrees
quantified over by the comparative (see (18)). In (29) and (30) the measure
phrase is supplied a single degree not a gap. This makes the right prediction
for (30), which is indeed ill formed. And it would make the right predictions
for any language that doesn’t allow direct measure phrases. But it fails for
examples like (29) involving adjectives that do, exceptionally, allow direct
measure phrase modification.
tall has to have a kind of meaning that allows for measure phrase
modification. It must undergo a lexical rule that produces homonyms and
these homonyms have to have interval arguments (sets of degrees) in place of
degree arguments. Such a rule is given in (31) :
(31) Homonym Rule : from degrees to intervals.
If A has meaning A' that relates individuals to degrees then A has a secondary
meaning relating individuals to sets of degrees (intervals).
The secondary meaning is given by : λI. λx. I = {d : A'(x,d)}
(32) Homonym Rule applies to tall, wide, deep, thick, old, long, high.
Following the translation scheme used so far, we’ll translate tall on its
primary meaning as tall1' and on its secondary meaning we’ll translate it as
tall2'. According to the rule in (31), tall2' relates an individual x to an interval
and that interval is just the set of all points on the scale that tall1' relates x to.
The rule in effect collects together all the degrees related to an individual in a
way reminiscent of how, on some accounts, the definite article collects all the
individuals in the extension of boy to give the meaning of the boys. The rule
is effectively a type-shifting rule targeting the degree argument 12.
(29) now needs to be revised as follows :
(33) a. Mary is [5 feet] tall.
b. ∃I [tall2'(m,I)  5feet'(I)]
Given the rule in (31), (33b), is equivalent to :
(34) 5feet'({d : tall1'(x,d)})
Putting this together with what was said above about the comparative in (25)
we have the following entailment. If Chris is 5 feet taller than his infant son,
and Mary is 5 feet tall, then the interval that includes all the points on the scale
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below Mary’s height is the same size as the interval stretching from Chris’
infant son’s height up to his own. Furthermore, each of these intervals can,
given what we said about the semantics of measure phrases, be partitioned
into five intervals each of which counts as a foot 13.
6. Antonyms
In order to see what goes wrong in *5 feet short, we need to think a bit
about the structure of the relevant scale as it compares with the scale for tall.
Consider first the sets in (35) and (36) of the kind produced by the
Homonym Rule :
(35) {d : John’s height exceeds d}
(36) {d : The height of the Eiffel Tower exceeds d}
Both of these sets have an upper bound, given by the respective heights of the
Eiffel Tower and of John. These sets share a lower bound. It’s the lower bound
for the scale itself ; the height that things approach as they become less and
less tall. Consider now the scale that includes the degrees for the predicate
short. The points themselves are the same as those for the scale for tall. The
same measure terms apply to sets of them. 3 inches shorter appears alongside
3 inches taller. The difference comes in the ordering of the points. If the Eiffel
Tower’s height is greater than John’s relative to the tall-ordering, then the
Eiffel Tower is taller than John. In that case, John’s height is greater than the
Eiffel Tower’s height relative to the short-ordering, and so John is shorter than
the Eiffel Tower. Let us now imagine that the Homonym Rule applied to
short. In that case, it would produce sets like in (37), where I’ve subscripted
“exceeds” to indicate that it is higher relative to the short-ordering :
(37) {d : John’s height exceeds
short d}
Like with (35), John’s height is the upper bound for this set, but unlike (35),
it has no lower bound. Recall that John’s height exceeds
short the height of the
Eiffel Tower hence the height of the Eiffel Tower is in (37). Likewise for the
heights of even taller structures, ad infinitum. (37) has an upper bound but no
lower bound.
Since the set in (37) has no lower bound, it couldn’t be partitioned into
a finite number of subsets each of which counts as a centimeter or a meter or
even a kilometer. For any finite n then, n meters short would be false. For this
reason it is not surprising that the Homonym Rule has not caught short in its
net. Similar reasoning applies to all the antonyms of the adjectives to which
the rule in fact applies [see (5)] 14.
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The two pictures below serve to illustrate the ideas in this and the
preceding three sections. Looking first at the picture on the left, imagine that
I’ve taken a set of bars of varying lengths and ordered them one above the
other, in increasing length. I draw a line next to the boards and on it I put
numbers corresponding to the boards. These numbers and the ones that come
between them represent our degrees. If the contextually specified degree-
value is 1 thenA and B count as long. If 3 is the contextually specified degree,
thenA is long but B is not. All of the points below 4 are those relative to which
A counts as long. The upper limit for that set is 4 which we now identify with
the length of A. In similar fashion we identify 2 as the length of B. A is longer
than B because 4 is higher than 2. Now, we introduce a measure term, call it
meter. We say that meter is true of the set of points between 0 and 1, between
1 and 2, and so on. The set of points between 2 and 4 can be partitioned into
two meter-intervals, hence the truth of A is two meters longer than B. Since
the interval between 0 and 4 is partitionable into 4 meter-intervals, A is 4
meters long is true.
0
7 1
6 2
5 3
4 4
3 5
2 6
1 7
0
long scale short scale
Now we turn to the picture on the right. Once again I’ve piled my bars
one on top of the other, but this time I’ve piled them in increasing order of
shortness. I draw a line next to the boards and put numbers corresponding to
the boards. These numbers and those numbers that come between them
represent our degrees. If the contextually specified degree-value is 5 then A
and B count as short. If 3 is the contextually specified degree, then B is short
but A is not. All of the points below 4 are those relative to which A counts as
short. The upper limit for that set is 4 which we now identify with the
shortness of A. In similar fashion we identify 2 as the shortness of B. B is
shorter than A because 2 is higher than 4. Now, we introduce a measure term,
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AA
B
B
call it meter. We say that meter is true of the set of points between 0 and 1,
between 1 and 2, and so on. The set of points between 2 and 4 can be
partitioned into two meter-intervals, hence the truth of B is two meters shorter
than B. The set of degrees relative to which A is short, in other words those
that satisfy short'(a,d), have 4 as the upper bound but no lower bound. For
finite n, n meters could never be true of that interval and hence it is no surprise
that the Homonym Rule does not apply to short.
7. The Homonym Rule and others like it
The adjective strong, the antonym of weak, at first appears not to be
one of those adjectives to which the homonym rule applies. A wind may be
described as 10-25 mph stronger than another, but never as *10 mph strong.
But there is another use of strong that appears exclusively with measure
phrases and has to do with numerical size. Focusing on that use we have the
following pattern of data :
(38) The army is *(1000 men) strong.
(39) *This army is stronger than that one.
(40) *How strong is their army?
This behavior can be explained by assuming that the second use of strong
while not the product of the homonym rule, does have a meaning of that type,
relating individuals to intervals. Since contexts supply degrees and not
intervals, it cannot be used in the positive. Degree quantifiers bind variables
over points on the scale and so they cannot bind the degree argument of strong
on this use. German schwer may be another example of this type. It normally
means ‘heavy’, but in conjunction with the right kind of measure phrase it can
mean ‘rich’, however it can’t be used in a comparative with this meaning :
(41) 46 000 Euro schwer. (42) *10 Euro schwerer
46,000 Euro rich 10 Euro richer
‘worth 46,000 Euro’ ‘10 Euro richer’
In section 2, I observed that for the most part, the adjectives in English
that fall under the homonym rule are a subset of those that do in German. spät
‘late’ and früh ‘early’ are exceptions to this rule. They take direct measure
phrases in English but not in German. But on closer inspection, late/early
pattern more like covert comparatives and may not fall under the homonym
rule even in English. late and early can take their measure phrase in the form
of a following by phrase, like comparatives and not like other absolute
adjectives :
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(43) He was late, by just two minutes.
(44) *He was tall, by just four feet.
(45) He was taller than me, by just four inches.
In fact, the semantics of 5 minutes late could not be the result of an
‘application’ of the homonym rule. Judging from its use in comparatives such
as The American revolution was later than the French revolution, late relates
events to times, with the times ordered in the direction of the flow of time
(early uses the opposite ordering). If we assume that time extends backwards
indefinitely then late is like short having no lower bound on the scale it makes
use of. And even if we assume there is a first moment, 5 minutes certainly is
not measuring a set of times whose lower bound is the first moment. Thus we
must assume that alongside our homonym rule in (31), there are other lexical
rules that apply to adjectives to produce covert comparatives. A related rule
applies in some languages to certain adjectives to produce comparative
meanings 15. These adjectives can dispense with the comparative morpheme.
This is illustrated with big versus sick in the following Modern Hebrew
examples :
(46) (yoter) gadol mimeni. (47) *(yoter) xole mimeni.
more big than-me more sick than-me
‘bigger than me’ ‘sicker than me’
The adjective short in five dollars short may be an adjective whose single
meaning is of the kind that is produced by the late/early rule. It takes a by
phrase, it won’t go into the comparative and it is interpreted relative to some
reference point.
The key idea here is that as a rule gradable adjectives do not have the
right kind of meaning to be directly modified by a measure phrase. In certain
exceptional cases, those that fall under the Homonym Rule (31), the
adjective’s meaning allows for this combination. Murphy (1997), following
Lehrer (1985) and Givón (1970), takes the opposite view. For her, the
adjective occurs inside the measure phrase. And the question of whether a
measure phrase will take an adjective or not depends on the measure term
itself. She writes “adjectives occur in measure phrases just in those cases
where ambiguity is a problem (because the same unit of measurement can
occur in different dimensions or with different starting points)”. I am
sympathetic with this idea as part of an account of which adjectives are likely
to acquire homonyms of the kind described by the Homonym Rule. I do not
however see that this account could replace the one proposed here. Measure
terms for weight are presumably no less ambiguous in German or Italian than
they are in French or English, nevertheless these languages differ with respect
to whether heavy and its cognates combine with a measure phrase. Pressure
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to eliminate ambiguity could push one way or the other, but it can’t predict
whether a particular measure phrase goes with a particular adjective or not.
The pragmatic view focuses on the meaning of the measure term while the
Homonym Rule focuses on the adjective. The Homonym Rule is needed to
explain the contrast between 2 inches high and *2 inches close to the desk
which involve the same ambiguous measure phrase but different adjectives.
Nonce measure phrases provide an extreme case of this type. One can say 2
cars deep and 2 cars wide but not *2 cars heavy. In the first two cases, the
adjective combines with a measure phrase and one is able to interpret car as
a unit of depth or width, as needed. The problem with *2 cars heavy is that
heavy doesn’t allow measure phrase modification, and not that we have a
problem understanding car as a unit of weight.
The Homonym Rule is one source of measure phrase modifiable
adjectives. Another source is a rule that creates covert comparatives. And still
other adjectives are unambiguous interval-predicates. These do not participate
in those constructions that rely on having a degree argument.
8. Noun Phrase Adjuncts
*Jack’s height tall is ungrammatical because even though Jack’s height
names a degree and tall has a degree argument, it is not the sort of argument
that can be saturated by anything but a functional head. What is permitted,
however, is for a non-functional phrase to act as a modifier, predicating upon
the degree argument of an adjective. Jack’s height couldn’t do that because it
isn’t a predicate of degrees. Measure phrases can’t in general perform this task
either because their semantics is that of a predicate of sets of points on a scale,
while the degree argument of tall is interpreted as a point on the scale. The
homonym rule applies to tall and some other adjectives to effectively type-
shift their degree argument from a point interpretation to a set-of-points-, or
interval-, interpretation paving the way for measure phrase modifiers.
From a formal point of view, measure phrases are completely ordinary
noun phrases. They show a number distinction of a familiar kind (1 foot, 2
feet, several feet) and their heads combine with specifiers and even some
modifiers (several dusty feet long – see Klooster, 1972) in a way that is typical
of nouns. This raises the question of their status as adjuncts. How are they
assigned case, for example? Why don’t they need to appear inside a
prepositional phrase or with adverbial morphology? I don’t have anything
substantial to add on this topic, I merely want to point out that they form part
of larger class of adjunct noun phrases.
Given the parallels I’ve drawn between degree arguments and
temporal arguments, it is natural to want to analogize measure phrases in AP
to bare-NP adverbs [Saturday in (48)]. Whatever the correct story is on these
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(Larson, 1985 ; McCawley 1988), they behave quite differently from measure
phrases. In the case of bare-NP adverbs, it is a special fact about the noun
phrase itself that allows it to occur as an adjunct, as the contrast in (48)
shows :
(48) a. She left Saturday.
b. *She left the weekend.
Measure phrases are not so constrained. An adjective, if it takes a direct
measure phrase, will take any relevant one16, even nonce ones : the pile was
five prisoners high.
Another place to look for counterparts of measure phrase modifiers is
among event adverbials. I think a good analogy does hold between measure
phrases and what Pereltsvaig (1999, 2001) has dubbed “adverbial cognate
objects”. The verbs in Pereltsvaig’s examples (49) and (50) have cognate
objects, so-called because the noun is morphologically related to the
governing verb.
(49) Paul danced a (slow) dance.
(50) Il a dansé une grande danse. (French)
he has danced a grand dance
‘He danced a grand dance.’
According to Pereltsvaig and others (see references in Pereltsvaig, 2001),
these cognate objects are actual arguments of the verb. By contrast, there are
cognate objects in Hebrew, Russian, Èdó, and Vietnamese that are not
arguments. These are the adverbial cognate objects, an example of which
appears in (51) below:
(51) hezin.u ’oto hazana melaxutit. (Modern Hebrew)
they-fed him feeding artificial
‘They fed him artificially.’ (Mittwoch, 1998 : 314)
The verb in (51) has a true object in addition to the cognate object, a sign that
the cognate-object is adverbial. Adverbial cognate objects can appear with a
much wider variety of verbal predicates than can true objects. Adverbial
cognate objects may even modify adjectival predicates :
(52) hu ’axrai ’axra’yut ’elyona (Modern Hebrew)
he responsible responsibility supreme
‘He has supreme responsibility.’ (Mittwoch, 1998 : 314)
The ‘cognate’ requirement may be traced to the fact that the noun is
interpreted as a predicate of events of the kind given by the verb. A non-
cognate noun would pick out different kinds of events. In other words, it is not
exactly a property of the noun itself that allows it to be a cognate object, rather
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it is the fact that the noun and the verb predicate of the same kinds of events.
In similar fashion, measure phrases and adjectives like tall2 or long2 fit
together because they are predicates of the same kinds of objects — intervals
of a given sort.
Adverbial cognate objects have a number of distinctive properties that
follow from their role as predicates. They can’t be formed with strong
quantifiers and they can’t be referential definites or pronominal (cf.
Moltmann, 1989 ; Mittwoch, 1998 ; Pereltsvaig, 1999, 2001). Direct measure
phrases obey these same constraints :
(53) *every inch tall.
*most years old.
(54) *my height tall.
(55) He knows [your height]i and he told me iti.
*It turns out I’m also iti tall.
(56) He knows [your age]i and he told me iti.
*It turns out I’m also iti old.
Since measure phrases always have predicative semantics, these constraints
are obeyed wherever measure phrases are used (Klooster, 1972 : 18ff ;
Jackendoff, 1977 : 163) :
(57) a. *He’s most feet taller.
b. *most feet of yarn
c. *He ran most miles.
d. *Most inches above the painting.
e. *It weighs almost every ton.
Mittwoch (1998) reports an observation of Edit Doron’s to the effect
that a cognate object does not interact scopally with an argument NP with
which it shares a clause. For example, (58) doesn’t allow a reading in which
the six visits are spread over different patients :
(58) ha-rofe biker xole yapani ‡i‡a bikurim. (Modern Hebrew)
the-doctor visited patient Japanese six visits
‘The doctor paid six visits to a Japanese patient.’ (Mittwoch, 1998 : 324)
Again, this follows from the predicative semantics of the adverbial cognate
object. It is not a quantifier over visits but rather a predicate of events. Direct
measure phrases likewise don’t interact scopally with argument NPs with
which they share a clause. (59) below is not scopally ambiguous 17.
(59) Every pig is exactly two days old.
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9. Conclusion
There are two possible kinds of non-thematic argument that a gradable
adjective could have. The first possibility is that the non-thematic argument is
a degree argument. This argument can be bound by degree operators such as
the comparative, too and enough. These operators can bind non-thematic
arguments, because they are functional morphemes. The other possibility is
that the non-thematic argument is a sets-of-degrees or interval argument.
Measure phrases are predicates of intervals hence they can be used as
predicates of these arguments. This is what happens in the phrase 2 inches
thick. Measure phrases have the syntax of noun phrases and, it turns out, their
interpretation follows familiar noun phrase semantics. Measure phrases do
not have functional heads but this does not prevent them from predicating of
non-thematic arguments. They follow the same pattern as adverbial cognate
objects which are noun phrase predicates of event arguments.
NOTES
1. This paper benefited greatly from colloquium audiences at U. Connecticut, U.
Delaware, U. Maryland and UCLA, from seminar participants at Rutgers U. and
Humboldt U. (Berlin), from conversations with Renate Raffelsiefen and Jane
Grimshaw and from comments of two anonymous reviewers. Daniel Büring and Ora
Matushansky posed questions that really shook the foundations and caused me to
completely rethink the analysis.
2. This idea is found, for example, in Cresswell (1976), von Stechow (1984),
Heim (2001), Matushansky (2002 : section 1.1.1), Meier (2003 : section 2.3).
3. A ‘pre-adjectival measure phrase’ sits right next to the adjective, to the left in
English, to the right in other languages. I use this term to exclude examples where the
adjective is in the comparative form or where a too intervenes : five feet taller, five feet
too tall.
4. Thanks to Renate Raffelsiefen for this point. The predicate-argument
generalization goes back at least to Schmerling (1976). It has been understood in terms
of ‘integration’ by Jacobs (1991), and in terms of ‘focus-domains’ by Gussenhoven
(1984,1992).
5. From Gawron (1995).
6. For the French data I thank Viviane Déprez, Philippe Schlenker and an
anonymous reviewer. For the German data, I thank Cécile Meier, Renate Raffelsiefen
and Alex Zepter.
7. gross takes measure phrases for 1 and 2 dimensional uses, but not for 3
dimensional uses.
8. Superlatives like hottest present an interesting case. They appear to presuppose
a gap between the highest ranked entity and those below it. It would be odd to declare
my coffee to be the hottest if we all have equally hot coffee. Measure phrases are not
allowed to the left of the adjective : *2° hottest, but they do appear in a following by
phrase : the hottest, by 2°. For illuminating discussion of this case see Stateva (2003).
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9. Faller (1999) and Winter (2001) are recent exceptions to this generalization.
10. And as an editor pointed out, when the number of subsets is given by a real
number other than one, we use the plural : 2,5 feet, zero feet, just as with concrete
nouns : 2,5 oranges, zero oranges.
11. (28) is a specific case of a general phenomenon discussed in Bouchard (1998)
whereby a pre-N adjective modifies a component internal to N.
12. This follows up on Fillmore (1965)’s idea that tall gets assigned a second sense
that shows up in the presence of measure phrases but short does not.
13. I’ve assumed that the measure function on which the meaning of foot is based
does not discriminate between the open interval (a,b) and the closed interval [a,b]. I
believe this is standard. These intervals differ by single points, which are of measure
0.
14. This account agrees with Hale (1970), Bierwisch (1967, 1989), Seuren (1978)
and Faller (1999) in tracing the infelicity of *5 meters short to the fact that the scale
associated with short has no lower bound or zero-point. Winter (2001) takes the
opposite view. He attributes the oddity of *five feet short to the fact that there is a
maximum short-degree rather than to the fact that there is no minimum short-degree.
Cresswell (1976), von Stechow (1984) and Kennedy (2001) distinguish tall-degrees
from short-degrees and they say that 5 meters denotes a tall-degree.
15. Thanks to Ora Matushansky for pointing out this connection.
16. much, a lot and a little share much of the distribution of measure phrases. They
all, for example, appear with the comparative : much taller. much and a lot do not
combine directly with adjectives, although a little does to some extent. I assume an
‘elsewhere’ account for *much tall along the lines of Doetjes (2001).
17. In (59), old is a predicate of intervals and so is the measure phrase. For the
measure phrase to take scope over the subject quantifier it would have to be a
quantifier itself, a quantifier over degrees, and old would have to be a predicate of
degrees. If that were possible, then the wide scope reading would be given by :
(i) [exactly two days]1 every pig was t1 old.
The underlined scope of the measure phrase quantifier would be true of a degree just
in case every pig were old relative to that degree. In other words, it would be true of
all degrees that lie below the age of the youngest pig. (59), if it had such a reading,
could mean that the youngest pig was more than 2 days old.
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RÉSUMÉ
Dans certaines langues, les syntagmes de mesure peuvent apparaître avec des
adjectifs non comparés (165 cm tall ‘haut de 165 cm’). Je traiterai trois
questions concernant cette construction : (a) le syntagme de mesure est-il un
argument de l’adjectif ou plutôt un adjoint ? (b) quel statut doit-on donner au
fait que cette construction est lexicalement restreinte à certains adjectifs (*5 kg
heavy ‘lourd de 5 kg’) ? (c) pourquoi cette restriction lexicale disparaît-elle
une fois que l’adjectif apparaît au comparatif (5 kg heavier ‘plus lourd de
5 kg’) ? Je propose que le syntagme de mesure est un adjoint qui modifie
l’argument de degré des adjectifs, comparable aux adverbes modifiant
l’argument d’événement du SV. L’argument de degré lui-même ne peut être
saturé que par un élément fonctionnel. Le type sémantique des syntagmes de
mesure n’est compatible avec une prédication directe d’un argument de degré
que dans les comparatifs. Par conséquent, je propose un changement de type
semblable à celui qui se produit dans les comparatifs. Cette règle est ici
lexicalement conditionnée s’appliquant à tall mais non à heavy.
MOTS CLÉS
Adjectif, syntagme de mesure, degré, catégorie fonctionnelle, lexical, adjoint,
argument, antonymie.
